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National Identities and Attitudes to Constitutional Change in the 
Post-Devolution UK: A four territories comparison 
 
This paper analyses survey data drawn from two distinct time points (2003 
and 2006/7) to examine whether national identities in the UK are associated 
with support for further constitutional change. It compares all four ‘national’ 
territories of the UK: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. We use 
logistic regression to model the relationships between identities and 
constitutional attitudes, taking into consideration other relevant social and 
political variables. While in England there is little evidence that national 
identities are constitutionally significant, in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland national identities remain significant in explaining support for 
constitutional change, even after we have controlled for the effects of other 
variables. However, this significance needs to be qualified by considering 
trends in national identification in these territories and the likelihood that 
these will contribute to demands for further constitutional change. 
 
This paper analyses social and political surveys to examine whether national identities 
in the UK are associated with support for further constitutional change. We build on a 
substantial body of previous research, but update and extend previous inquiry in at 
least two important respects. First, we compare all four territories of the UK, a 
significant endeavour since little contemporary comparative research of this nature 
has been done. Second, we undertake analysis at two distinct time points (2003 and 
2006/7) in order to identify consistent patterns in the data. We exploit the wealth of 
survey data which has been inspired by constitutional change and some of the 
innovative research programmes by which it has been accompaniedi, creating a 
unique opportunity for comparative analysis.  
 
We begin by reviewing the ways in which (national) identities have been understood 
conceptually and the implications which these understandings have for empirical 
research in this area. Important here is the recognition that social identities in general 
are characterised by multiplicity. Individuals conceive themselves as belonging to a 
number of social collectivities, each of which contributes to their overall sense of self. 
We are primarily concerned with a specific sub-category of social identity, that of 
territorial identities, which are often in themselves of a multiple nature. Moreover, 
these different sources of identification are not entirely independent of one another 
but will, under given circumstances, interact. Our work recognises this in two 
respects. First, we consider how different territorial identities which might equally be 
classed as ‘national’ relate to each other. Second, we take into consideration 
relationships between these and other types of social identity (political, demographic, 
economic, religious, linguistic). We also recognise that social identities are fluid: their 
salience and the ways in which they are understood are subject to change, over time, 
across different contexts and between different individuals. While this point is to 
some extent offered as a methodological caveat with respect to our primarily 
quantitative research approach, we offer a defence of the quantitative employment of 
categorical identities and also incorporate change as an important element through 
examining data from two distinct time periods. 
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Having laid this conceptual groundwork we then outline the principal means by which 
national identities have been measured in survey research in the UK and, using one 
particular measure which can be applied across all four UK territories, we examine 
the contemporary distribution of these identities. In the final and most important part 
of the paper, following a review of previous relevant survey-based research, we model 
the relationships between identities and constitutional attitudes, taking into 
consideration other relevant social and political variables. 
 
Conceptualising and researching national identities 
Robin Cohen (1994: 204) argues that for some academics, ‘… the construction, 
reproduction and reshaping of identity is the crucial preoccupation of our era’. 
Significantly, this reflection comes towards the end of a book specifically concerned 
with British identity, and others have argued that national identities are especially 
central to modern social life. Thompson (2001: 21), for example, states that ‘Even in 
those parts of the globe where globalisation is at its most advanced, national identities 
remain crucially important for the great majority of the populations’.  
 
However, contemporary understandings of identities highlight the potential 
difficulties of research in this area. ‘Constructivist’ conceptualisations of identities 
highlight their fluid and multiple nature (Cohen, 1994; Kohli, 2000; McCrone, 1997: 
582)ii, and this means that individuals may mobilize different identities in different 
social contexts (Bechhofer et al, 1999; Cohen, 1994; Todd et al, 2006). This point can 
be extended to territorial identities. Some have argued that individuals may identify 
with a hierarchical (or concentric) range of territories extending from their immediate 
neighbourhood, through wider locale, region, nation, state, and supra-state (Cohen, 
1982; Colley, 1992; Smout, 1994). There are features of the UK which mark it out as 
both typical and atypical in this respect. Its incorporation of so-called ‘stateless 
nations’ such as Scotland and Wales and the existence of an obvious supra-state 
referent in the shape of Europe/the EU increase the likely salience of these territorial 
levels and facilitate dual ‘national’ identities. But while these features are shared by 
other European multinational states such as Spain and Belgium, in other parts of 
Europe there will be no evident territorial level lying between region and (nation-) 
state. In some parts of world suprastate identities might be less obviously available 
(and lacking the collective rights and symbols of European identity). Moreover, those 
other social identities which might have significant associations with national 
identities will vary both within and between national state contexts. For example, as 
we shall see, we expect that language might be an important correlate of national 
identity in Wales, as it is in Catalonia and Quebec (to take two other ‘stateless 
nations’), but this is much less obviously true of Scotland. Similarly, we would expect 
religious and national identities in Northern Ireland to be associated to a much greater 
extent than in other parts of the UK. A related point is that it is also true that similar 
national identities may be understood and interpreted quite differently between 
individuals (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Miller, 1995; Thompson, 2001). Thus identity 
‘labels’ may be identical but their perceived ‘content’ may be different (Thompson, 
2001: 24; Todd et al, 2006: 328; Todd, 2007: 567). 
 
Such observations suggest that it would be problematic to base research on national 
identities solely upon survey-based approaches which entail respondents self-
categorising into various national identity groups. Hence qualitative research 
strategies which can draw out the complexity and contingency of the construction and 
employment of national identities provide an essential parallel to more quantitative 
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studies. Two series of UK studies based on in-depth interviews with theoretically-
grounded samples of respondents merit particular attention. Condor and colleagues 
have explored English and British national identities among a broad spectrum of 
people in England (Condor, 1996 and 2000; Condor & Abell, 2006; Condor et al, 
2006). McCrone, Bechhofer, Kiely and colleagues in their studies of Scotland’s 
landed and arts elites (Bechhofer et al, 1999; Kiely et al, 2001; McCrone et al, 1998) 
and of ‘Scottish nationals’ and ‘English migrants’ (Kiely et al, 2005a and 2005b) have 
explored the bases and nature of Scottish and British identities. Similar interview-
based research in Wales highlights the importance of language in the understanding of 
Welsh identity, a dimension largely absent in England and Scotland (see Thompson & 
Day, 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, quantitative approaches in themselves have considerable value. Let us 
consider the contention, implicit in ‘constructivist’ conceptions of identity, that 
observing that two or more individuals claim the same national identity may in fact 
tell us little. As Stuart Hall reminds us, ‘… when we come to consider whether 
national identities are being dislocated, we must bear in mind the way national 
cultures help to ‘stitch up’ differences into one identity’ (1992: 299). In recognising 
that national identities accommodate diversity and contested meanings it does not 
necessarily follow that such identities, even understood in broad categorical terms, are 
not endowed with social and political significance for those who share them. As 
Cohen argues: 
 
If, instead of announcing myself as, say, Sri Lankan, I say “I am Tamil”, I do 
not mean to suggest that I am just like any other Tamil. I do not have to 
sublimate myself in an anonymizing “Tamil-ness” in order to suggest that 
Tamils have something in common which distinguishes them from Sinhalese. 
(1993: 198).  
 
Claims to a similar national identity can have significance in and of themselves, 
notwithstanding the various qualifications and caveats we have discussed. 
Quantitative research based on self-categorisation into various (national) identities 
remains important because, as Bechhofer and McCrone point out (2007: 253), there 
are certain dimensions of national identity which necessitate investigation through 
large-scale sample surveys, notwithstanding the undoubted limitations of this method. 
This is true not least because, as Coakley (2007: 575) observes, ‘… qualitative data 
typically lack the reach and representative capacity that is possible with large 
surveys’. It is data from such surveys which we employ in this paper. In doing so we 
are building on a well-established body of research in the UK, stretching back over a 
considerable period.   
 
The introduction of survey questions on national identity has varied across the 
constituent territories of the UK, undoubtedly related to their different political 
contexts. An early example of a political scientist employing a survey to measure 
(inter alia) national identity was Rose’s 1968 ‘Loyalty survey’ in Northern Ireland 
(Rose, 1971), which was followed by a similar survey ten years later (Moxon-
Browne, 1983; see also Gallagher, 1995; Todd et al, 2006). These employed a 
‘forced’ choice measure of national identity, offering respondents a list of identities 
and asking them to choose only that which ‘best’ described them, an approach still 
broadly employed in Northern Irish surveys (Coakley, 2007: 583).  
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However, phrasing survey questions in such a way does not allow an individual to 
express multiple national identities, a limitation particularly germane to the UK for 
the reasons outlined above. Although for some individuals certain national identities 
may be mutually exclusive and competing, for others these may overlap and be 
adhered to simultaneously. In each of the four territories plurality is represented by 
the existence of what we describe, for the sake of conceptual clarity, as ‘state’ and 
‘sub-state’ national identities (others have described these as ‘state’ / ‘national’ 
(McCrone et al, 1998; Bechhofer et al, 1999) or ‘state’ / ‘ethnonational’ (Heath & 
Kellas, 1998; Kellas, 1998)). This conceptual division may not, however, do full 
justice to the nuances of popular understanding. As many have pointed out, the UK 
lacks a collective label for its citizens (Crick, 1989; Kumar, 2003; Nairn, 1988). 
While the ‘state’ identity might be understood as ‘British’, for many this will be 
considered as much a national identity as the ‘sub-state’ identities of English, Scottish 
and Welsh (Bryant, 2006; Gallagher, 1995: 721; Langlands, 1999). Further, while in 
Scotland and Wales distinctions between state and sub-state national identities are 
relatively clearly understood, in England many people may conflate English and 
British identities (Kumar, 2003; Langlands, 1999; Rose, 1982). In Northern Ireland 
the situation is yet more complex. There is less historical and popular support for the 
notion that Northern Ireland can be understood as a nation in its own right (Gallagher, 
1995). Further, the issue of the state (and state identity) in Northern Ireland is at the 
very heart of its conflict, and for most people national identity boils down to a 
mutually exclusive choice between British or Irish.  
 
To reflect the existence of dual/multiple national identities, survey questions have 
been developed which go beyond a singular (‘best’ or ‘forced’) conception of national 
identity. A now common question offers respondents multiple choices from a suite of 
national/territorial identities; another, originally developed in another manifestly 
multinational state – Spain – allows people to assign relative weight to their ‘state’ 
and ‘national’ identity (see Gunther et al, 1986), and is often referred to as the 
‘Moreno question’ after the researcher pioneering its use in the UK (Moreno, 1988).  
 
Numerous studies report analysis of these various survey questions on national 
identities in the UK. Data from Northern Ireland dates from the late 1960s (Gallagher, 
1995; Moxon-Browne, 1983; Rose, 1971), and Scottish and Welsh data from the 
1970s (Brand et al, 1993 and 1994; Brown et al, 1998; Curtice, 2005 and 2006; 
McCrone, 2001; Paterson et al, 2001; Paterson, 2002). From the 1990s, various 
studies compared England, Scotland and Wales (Brown et al, 1996 and 1998; Curtice 
& Heath, 2000; Heath & Kellas, 1998; Henderson, 1999; Kellas, 1998; McCrone, 
2001; Paterson, 2002). There is only one notable, and now rather dated, comparison 
of national identities in all four UK territories (Rose, 1982). This is also based on a 
Gallup poll rather than a more established social or political survey, and the basis of 
comparison thus weakened.  
 
This research does not address all the limitations associated with investigating 
national identities through survey methods. As Wyn Jones (2001: 46) points out, even 
relatively subtle measures such as ‘Moreno’ cannot account for shifts in national 
identification based on different social or political contexts (see also Coakley, 2007: 
584-5; Muldoon et al, 2007: 92). Nor do they uncover the various meanings national 
categories might hold (Brand et al, 1993; Heath & Kellas, 1998; Henderson, 1999), 
although some quantitative studies have sought to address this question (see 
Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007; Haesly, 2005). Nevertheless, surveys show consistent 
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patterns of difference between the four territories and correlation with other key social 
and political variables within them (see e.g. McCrone et al, 1998; McCrone, 2001) 
and with alternative measures of national identity and sentiment (see e.g. Heath et al, 
1999; Heath & Smith, 2005). The consistencies are such that we can be confident that, 
notwithstanding their limitations, these means of measurement are methodologically 
robust: they are telling as something ‘real’ about national identities in the UKiii. 
Moreover, there is evidence of convergence in findings between studies utilising 
primarily quantitative and qualitative methods (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007).  
 
Data sources 
Given that, while recognising some limitations, we can invest a degree of confidence 
in survey data concerning national identities, the analysis in the remainder of the 
paper is based on such data. These are drawn from a number of different sources 
appropriate to each of the four UK territories. Relevant surveys must (minimally) 
include measures of national identities and of attitudes toward the constitutional 
future of the territory in question. To enable us to make use of the most contemporary 
data available at the time of writing and to assess consistency over time they must 
also (ideally) be conducted annually. In addition, they must be based on substantial 
samples of respondents for each territory. The annual British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSA) meets most of these conditions, but because it excludes Northern Ireland and 
includes only relatively small sub-samples of respondents in Scotland and Wales, we 
use it solely for analysis of data from England. Fortunately, since devolution there has 
also been an annual Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) which contains questions 
appropriate to our needs, and the same is true of the annual Northern Ireland Life and 
Times Survey (NILT). At the time of writing, the most recent year from which data 
were available from all three of these sources was 2006. However, there is no 
corresponding 2006 survey specific to Wales and we therefore use data from the 
slightly more recent 2007 Wales Life and Times Study (WLT)iv. 
 
Comparing dual and exclusive national identities in the four territories 
We now offer a brief outline of the distribution of national identities within and 
between the four territories. In a context of multiple identities, of particular interest is 
the degree to which identities are exclusive or overlapping, not least state and sub-
state national identities. Although they are by no means rooted solely in national 
identities (see, e.g. Brown et al, 1999), sub-state identity is an important source of 
legitimacy for the new political institutions in the UK. But at the same time such 
identities may also stimulate demands for more far-reaching autonomy, and thus 
disrupt the constitutional status quo. Whether or not they have devolved or federated 
political power to sub-state national or regional territories, states require a certain 
degree of shared identity to maintain their coherence. Where different, exclusively 
held identities dominate in different territories, or where the state national identity is 
very much of secondary importance to the majority of citizens, then this may have 
implications for the constitutional future of that state, although, as we shall see below, 
it is important not to make simplistic assumptions about associations between national 
identities and attitudes to constitutional change.  
 
Although some argue that it is preferable to measure ethnonational identities in a 
‘graded’ as opposed to ‘nominal’ fashion (see e.g. Brady and Kaplan, 2000) we do not 
have the kind of shared data across all four UK territories which would enable us to 
construct such a measure. We lack data on how people relate with and to members of 
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other national groups, which are, e.g., employed by Brady and Kaplan (ibid.) to 
construct quite a complex scale measure of national identity. Nor, as will be noted 
below, do we even have more rudimentary scale measures of national identity which 
are used consistently across all parts of the UK. We can, however, assess the balance 
between exclusive and dual identities in the UK using the ‘multiple choice’ measure 
noted abovev. Table 1 presents the most contemporary data from this question. In 
Wales this is drawn from 2007 and in England and Scotland 2006. Due to the 
preponderance of the ‘forced choice’ measure in Northern Ireland (see above), the 
most recent ‘multiple choice’ data are from 2003. 
 
Table 1: Multiple choice national identities 
 
% British English Scottish Welsh Irish N.Irish Sample size 
England 68 67 3 2 3 * 3666 
Scotland 43 4 84 * 1 1 1594 
Wales 58 11 2 67 1 * 884 
N.Ireland 49 1 1 * 30 33 1800 
* = 0.5% or less 
Sources: BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006; SCOTTISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006; WELSH 
LIFE AND TIMES, 2007; NORTHERN IRELAND LIFE AND TIMES, 2003. 
 
In Scotland, the sub-state identity is particularly prominent in relation to the state 
identity. In Wales, rather more people choose the sub-state option but the proportion 
who do so is not markedly greater than the proportion who identify as British. In 
England, sub-state and state identities are chosen by virtually identical numbers. 
Given that the total percentages in each of these three countries clearly exceed 100%, 
it is evident that substantial proportions have a dual state/sub-state identity. This is 
less clear in Northern Ireland, and indeed here no single identity is chosen by a 
majority.vi  
 
Table 2 offers a more explicit demonstration of the preponderance of dual identities 
shown by the multiple choice measure. It shows the proportion of respondents 
choosing both a state and sub-state national identity, and the proportion opting for 
either one exclusively of the others (or opting for neither). The initial (2003) data 
shown for Northern Ireland indicate only the degree to which the two potential state 
identities (i.e. British and/or Irish) are complementary or exclusive. The table also 
shows (in brackets) more contemporary 2006 data from Northern Ireland, derived 
from the following direct question concerning dual and exclusive identities: ‘What 
nationality are you?’, with the specified options British, Irish, British and Irish or 
Other. It is these data which are used in our subsequent analysis of Northern Ireland 
(see table 8). 
 
Table 2: Dual and exclusive national identitiesvii 
(X = English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish in relevant territory) 
 
 England Scotland Wales Northern Ireland 
 % % % % 
British and X 45 33 33 3 (8) 
British but not X 23 10 25   46 (56) 
X but not British 22 51 35   26 (33) 
Neither of these 9 6 7 24 (4) 
     
Sample size 3666 1594 884 1800 (1230) 
Sources: BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006; SCOTTISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006; WELSH 
LIFE AND TIMES, 2007; NORTHERN IRELAND LIFE AND TIMES, 2003 (2006). 
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These data clarify and substantiate the figures shown in table 1. If we focus first on 
those who choose one identity but not the other, in Scotland and Wales (but especially 
so in Scotland) the sub-state national identity has greater relative prominence, 
whereas in England the proportions who choose each identity exclusive of the other 
are very similar. Large minorities in all three of these territories also adopt a dual 
identity. This is an evident contrast to Northern Ireland where dual identities are rare, 
highlighting the competing nature of British and Irish identities. The rather different 
means of eliciting these data in 2006 does increase the proportion of dual identifiers 
somewhat, but this still accounts for less than one in ten. Indeed the most notable 
effect of the change in question is that when the sub-state option of Northern Irish is 
explicitly removed fewer people ‘opt out’ of both British and Irish categoriesviii. 
While we cannot use the 2006 data to assess how many people in Northern Ireland 
have a dual state/sub-state identity, if we use the 2003 data to expand our measure of 
dual identities to encompass any dual or multiple combinations of British, Irish, 
Northern Irish or Ulster, such designations still account for less than 15% of all 
respondents (not shown in table 2). Although the argument that national identification 
often tends to be dual (or indeed multiple) holds for the three territories in Britain, it 
cannot be extended to Northern Ireland.  
 
While table 2 shows the preponderance of dual and exclusive identities in each 
territory it gives little information about the relative weight which respondents place 
on national identities, particularly where dual identities are in evidence. This can be 
explored by asking people which identity ‘best’ describes them. In England, Scotland 
and Wales the question is asked as a follow-up to the multiple choice question for 
those who chose more than one national identity: ‘And if you had to choose, which 
one best describes the way you think of yourself?’. In Northern Ireland, respondents 
are asked the familiar ‘best choice’ question described earlier: ‘Which of these best 
describes the way you think of yourself?’, with the options being British, Irish, Ulster, 
Northern Irish or Other. The results, shown in table 3, substantiate previous research 
and the findings shown in tables 1 and 2. The most notable feature is that, in Scotland 
especially but also in Wales, it is clear that the state identity has a secondary salience 
for most respondents, although in England the sub-state identity is also chosen to a 
somewhat greater degree than the state identity.  
 
Table 3: Best choice national identities 
 
 England Scotland Wales N.Ireland 
 % % % % 
British 38  14  32 39 
English 47  2  7 - 
Scottish 2  78  1 - 
Welsh 1  *  56 - 
Irish 1  *  1  28 
Northern Irish *  1  *  26 
Ulster * * * 4 
     
Sample size 3666 1594 884 1230 
* = 0.5% or less; - = not specifically recorded in Northern Ireland 
Sources: BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006; SCOTTISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006; WELSH 
LIFE AND TIMES, 2007; NORTHERN IRELAND LIFE AND TIMES, 2006. 
 
 
National identities and constitutionally-significant political attitudes 
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The varying patterns of national identities we have outlined thus far may in 
themselves have political implications in that where many people do not identify with 
the state identity, or regard it as secondary to their sub-state identity, then there is 
potential to fuel demands for further autonomy at the sub-state level, or to wholly 
renegotiate the state/sub-state relationship. However, this assumes that national 
identities map on to political perspectives of territorial-constitutional significance, and 
that powerful sub-state or alternative state identities are clearly associated with 
‘separatist’ aspirations rather than, for example, broad contentment with the degree of 
autonomy (for some territories) introduced in the late 20th century.  
 
A substantial body of previous survey-related work has explored how 
constitutionally-significant political factors such as party support (actual or intended 
vote, or broader party identification) and preferred means of governing the territory in 
question (broadly, independence, devolution, or centralized government) may be 
associated with national identities in the UK. Such work can be divided around 1999 
into pre- and post-devolution periods. Heath and Kellas (1998) offer a rare example of 
comparative work in the pre-devolution period. Their analysis of England, Scotland 
and Wales suggested that national identities might be linked to future political 
developments, with those who adopted exclusive identities in each country displaying 
a stronger appetite for constitutional change than those with dual identities. Aside 
from this there is little notable pre-devolution research concerned with national 
identities and political attitudes in England, reflecting the comparative lack of concern 
with national identities in that country during this time.  
 
Relevant pre-devolution studies concerned specifically with Scotland (Brand et al 
1993, 1994; Brown et al, 1998) indicated a clear association between national 
identities and constitutionally-significant political views with, for example, those with 
an exclusive Scottish (rather than British) identity more likely to support the SNP and 
to favour Scottish independence. However, they also established that most supporters 
of the SNP and of independence were not ‘exclusive Scots’, and even those with the 
most unionist political attitudes (i.e. supporters of the Conservatives and opponents of 
devolution) were more likely to prioritize a Scottish rather than British identity. Such 
findings revealed a ‘non-alignment’ between identities and political attitudes in 
Scotland (Bond, 2000). Research in Wales (Balsom, 1985; Cooke, 1989) showed that 
national identities were associated with vote and constitutional preference, but that the 
articulation of Welsh national identity and capacity to speak Welsh was most 
significant, particularly with respect to voting for Plaid Cymru and supporting 
devolution. Nevertheless, ‘non-alignment’ was evident here too.  
 
Rose (1982: 17) provided an early example of relevant survey-based research which 
was both comparative and included Northern Ireland. This indicated that identities 
and political behaviour were more ‘aligned’ in Northern Ireland: at the 1979 General 
Election only 21% of Scottish identifiers and 10% of Welsh identifiers voted for the 
Nationalist party in these respective territories, whereas in Northern Ireland 60% of 
Catholic Irish identifiers voted for the nationalist SDLP. Other relevant research 
conducted in Northern Ireland has tended to be specific to that territory. Moxon-
Browne (1983) showed that while more than three-quarters of SDLP supporters in a 
1978 survey identified primarily as Irish, more than 90% of those identifying 
themselves as supporters of either of the two main unionist parties (OUP and DUP) 
chose either a British or Ulster national identityix. Later work based on the 1994 
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Northern Ireland Social Attitudes survey suggested that the alignment between 
identities and political attitudes remained strong (Breen, 1996; Trew, 1996).  
 
Relevant post-devolution research in Scotland continued to highlight the non-
alignment of national identities and political attitudes (Paterson et al, 2001). Wyn 
Jones’s analysis of the immediate post-devolution period in Wales suggested that one 
of the eponymous ‘unintended consequences’ of constitutional change had been ‘… 
the new prominence and role that national identity has acquired in Welsh politics’ 
(2001: 35). Work on identities and constitutional attitudes in England in the early 
post-devolution period indicated that any such associations were rather weak. Clear 
majorities in England, regardless of national identity, appeared to be content with the 
asymmetry of Scottish and Welsh devolution paralleled by centralized Westminster 
government for England (Curtice & Heath, 2000). Perhaps the most comprehensive 
comparative post-devolution study is provided by Curtice’s (2006) analysis of 
England, Scotland and Wales, which related constitutional preference (i.e. best means 
of governing each territory) to national identities. This analysis, using 2003 data, 
generally substantiates previous research: identity in England makes little difference 
but in Scotland and Wales there is an association with constitutional preferences, 
albeit that devolution clearly enjoys the strongest support regardless of national 
identity in both countries. Relevant post-devolution research in Northern Ireland has 
tended to examine how religion may be associated with national identities and/or 
political preferences (see, e.g., Coakley, 2007; Todd et al, 2006) rather than 
employing identity as an independent variable and relating this to opinions on the 
territory’s constitutional future. This doubtless reflects an earlier observation by Trew 
(1998: 61) that in Northern Ireland ‘… although the Protestant and Catholic labels are 
denominational they are also assumed to reflect contrasting national identities and 
political allegiance between nationalist Irish Catholics and unionist British 
Protestants’. 
 
Our task now is to build on and develop this previous research in three key respects. 
Firstly, we are still (relatively speaking) in the early days of the post-devolution UK 
and constitutional arrangements remain subject to change. It is therefore imperative 
that we update analysis of the association between national identities and 
constitutional attitudes to include the most recently available data. This takes us to 
near the end of the second electoral period of the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and we also examine how our findings 
compare with data from the end of the first period of devolution (2003). Secondly, we 
once more expand this analysis to compare all four UK territories at a similar time 
point. Thirdly, although our principal concern is a comparison of the degree to which 
national identities are associated with constitutionally-significant political attitudes in 
the four territories, we will assess the importance of these identities relative to other 
political and social factors. This is important both because patterns of national identity 
often vary in relation to other characteristics such as political perspective, social class, 
age, religion and language, and because these factors sometimes have a more direct 
association with attitudes to constitutional change.  
 
In order to take account of these various effects we present logistic regression models 
for each territory using the most contemporary (2006/2007) data, and in each case 
assessing those elements of the model which are consistent with similar models 
constructed using 2003 data. In each territory we examine associations with a 
dichotomous dependent variable which indicates support for further constitutional 
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change. Each of these variables is shaped to a degree by the precise survey questions 
on constitutional preferences from which they have been derived. These are given in 
full in the appendix. However, we have also made active decisions about the 
specification of the dichotomous dependent variable in each territory. In doing so we 
focus on constitutional positions which would represent a substantial and novel 
change to the status quo. Thus we do not, for example, focus specifically on support 
for the status quo ante of sole Westminster government in any of the devolved 
territories. It is also important that dichotomization does not divide respondents into a 
very small minority and a large majority, and for this reason we do not specify 
support for independence alone in Wales or for an independent Northern Ireland. 
Therefore, in Scotland, we analyse support for an independent Scottish state; in 
Wales, support for further autonomy either in the form of independence or a 
parliament with legislative and tax-raising powers; and in Northern Ireland support 
for re-unification with the Republic of Ireland. In the case of England we employ two 
separate models with different dependent variables representing support for the most 
likely alternatives to the status quo: an English parliament or elected regional 
assemblies.   
 
The measure of national identity we employ as an explanatory variable is that outlined 
in table 2 above since, in contrast to possible alternatives such as the ‘Moreno’ scale 
which it is difficult to use in Northern Ireland (see Coakley, 2007), this can be applied 
in all four territories. In England, Scotland and Wales, this indicates exclusive or dual 
state/sub-state national identities derived from the ‘multiple choice’ measure shown in 
table 1. In Northern Ireland we employ the more direct measure of exclusive or dual 
British/Irish identities used in 2006. We assess the explanatory significance of several 
other political and social variables: party identification, position on a left-right scale,x 
age, social class (based on the NS-SEC occupational categorisationxi), capacity to 
speak the Welsh language (in Wales only), and, for Northern Ireland only, religionxii. 
For each of these explanatory variables we first carried out a bivariate cross-tabulation 
with the relevant dependent variable and then, only if this showed a statistically 
significant association (p < 0.05) was the explanatory variable included in the final 
logistic regression model. The final models for each territory using 2006/07 data are 
presented below, and in each case we discuss the model and relate the findings to 
those derived from an identical exercise using 2003 data. This allows us to identify 
and highlight only those variables and categories which are consistently significant 
across both time periods. 
 
England 
Table 4 shows the 2006 logistic regression model for support for an English 
parliament. This is a rather restricted model in that only two explanatory variables – 
party identification and national identity – had a statistically significant bivariate 
association with the dependent variable. Where categorical variables such as these are 
used in logistic regression models a reference or base category is specified against 
which other categories are compared. The first column of the table shows, for each 
categorical variable included in the model, the reference category and the other 
categories which are compared against it. So, in table 4 the reference category for 
party identification is Labour and the other categories are Conservative, Liberal 
Democrat and None (i.e. no party identification). The final column of the table shows 
the odds ratio for each of these categories relative to the reference category. In this 
instance it shows the likelihood, once the effects of the other variables in the model 
have been controlled for, that someone who, for example, supports the Conservative 
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party will support an English parliament compared to someone who supports Labour. 
An odds ratio of 1 indicates no difference in likelihood; the magnitude of an odds 
ratio greater than 1 gives an indication of how much more likely someone in the given 
party category is to support an English parliament than is someone in the reference 
(Labour party) category, and the magnitude of an odds ratio lower than 1 gives an 
indication of how much less likely they are to support this constitutional positionxiii. 
The same principle of interpretation can be applied to the national identity variable, 
for which the reference category is English and British (i.e. a dual identity), and 
indeed for all categorical variables in the tables below. Also important is the 
penultimate column of the table which indicates statistical significance 
(conventionally, values of less than 0.05 are accepted as statistically significant).  
 
Table 4: Logistic regression model of support for English parliament, England 
 B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio 
Party     
(Labour)     
Conservative .889 .232 .000 2.433 
Lib Dem .600 .295 .042 1.822 
None .649 .278 .019 1.914 
     
National Identity     
(English and British)     
English only .366 .226 .106 1.441 
British only -.359 .255 .159 .698 
Neither -.033 .362 .926 .967 
Source: BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006 
 
 
The table shows that when both variables are entered into the model the effect of 
national identity is no longer significant. Compared to Labour, supporters of the other 
two parties (and of none) are significantly more likely to favour an English 
parliament, but this finding is not consistent with the 2003 analysis, where differences 
in party identification were not found to be significant. Hence in terms of support for 
an English Parliament there are no variables which are significant across both time 
periods.  
 
Table 5 shows a similar model from 2006, this time with support for elected regional 
assemblies as the dependent variable. Once more only two of the original explanatory 
variables had a significant bivariate relationship with the dependent variable and are 
therefore included in the model. As well as our now familiar categorical variable of 
party identification, this model includes a continuous variable: age in years. For 
variables of this nature interpretation of the model is somewhat different. The odds 
ratio represents the relative likelihood of taking a positive value in the dependent 
variable (i.e. in this case supporting regional assemblies) for each unit increase in 
the explanatory variable (in this case an increase of one year). Hence for continuous 
variables such as age (which have many potential values) even an odds ratio which is 
quite modestly different from 1 may be statistically significant (because a much 
greater difference in age would have a much larger effect). The table suggests that age 
has a significantly negative effect on support for regional assemblies: i.e., other things 
being equal, older respondents are less likely to support this constitutional option. 
Party identification is once more significant, but on this occasion it is only Liberal 
Democrat supporters who are significantly more likely to support regional assemblies 
compared with Labour. However, a similar effect related to party identification was 
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not evident in the analysis of 2003 data. The only finding which is consistent across 
both 2003 and 2006 is that younger people are more likely to support elected regional 
assemblies. Note that for neither constitutional alternative in England is national 
identity a significant factor. 
 
Table 5: Logistic regression model of support for Regional Assemblies, England 
 B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio 
Party     
(Labour)     
Conservative -.144 .244 .553 .865 
Lib Dem .676 .266 .011 1.966 
None .434 .262 .097 1.544 
     
Age     
(in years) -.011 .005 .040 .989 
Source: BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006 
 
 
Scotland 
Table 6 shows the 2006 logistic regression model for support for an independent 
Scotland. On this occasion all five initial explanatory variables had a significant 
bivariate relationship with the dependent variable, and four of these remained 
significant in the logistic regression model (the exception being social class). 
However, in the 2003 analysis age was not significantly associated with attitudes to 
the constitution. Three variables are therefore significant across both survey years: 
position on the left-right scale, party identification and national identity. Like age, 
position on the left-right scale is a continuous variable and the data must be 
interpreted accordingly. But unlike age the scale has a restricted range, from a 
minimum of 1 (most left-wing) to a maximum of 5 (most right-wing). The odds ratio 
in this instance relates to each unit increase on the scale. Being more right-wing has a 
consistently negative relationship with support for independence: for each unit 
increase on the scale toward the most right-wing position, the odds ratio is 0.705 in 
2006, and a similarly significant pattern was evident in 2003 (odds ratio = 0.583). In 
terms of party identification, the party reference category is Labour. Not surprisingly, 
identifying with the SNP has a strongly positive relationship with support for 
independence in both years (in 2006, as shown in the table, odds ratio = 3.609; in 
2003 = 5.729). No other significant differences related to party identification were 
found in both years. Finally, national identity also shows a consistent significant 
pattern across both surveys, and to some extent this takes the form we might have 
predicted. The reference category is those with a dual (Scottish and British) identity, 
and compared to them respondents with an exclusive Scottish identity are more likely 
to support independence in both surveys (in 2006, odds ratio = 2.479, in 2003, = 
2.214). However, it is interesting that while those with an exclusively British identity 
were significantly less likely to support independence in 2003, as table 6 shows there 
is no significant difference with the dual identity category in 2006. Overall then, 
unlike in England, national identity has a significant association with constitutional 
attitudes even after other key variables have been controlled. However, this is true 
only in the sense that having an exclusive sub-state identity is associated with support 
for independence. Those with an exclusive state identity are not significantly less 
likely to support this option compared with the dual identity category – at least not 
consistently so in both surveys. We must also emphasize that in both 2006 and 2003 
the status quo (devolution), was the most popular option across all categories of 
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national identity, including those with an exclusive Scottish identity. Hence national 
identities are significant but a degree of ‘non-alignment’ with political attitudes 
remains evident. 
 
Table 6: Logistic regression model of support for Scottish independence, Scotland 
 B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio 
Party     
(Labour)     
Conservative -.444 .275 .106 .641 
Lib Dem -.170 .284 .551 .844 
SNP 1.285 .185 .000 3.615 
None -.041 .223 .853 .960 
     
Social Class     
(Employers, Managers and Professionals)     
Intermediate .162 .270 .549 1.176 
Small employers and self-employed .210 .299 .482 1.234 
Lower supervisory/technical .088 .222 .691 1.092 
Semi-routine/routine .290 .191 .129 1.337 
     
National Identity     
(Scottish and British)     
Scottish only .908 .162 .000 2.480 
British only -.398 .353 .260 .672 
Neither -.471 .470 .316 .624 
     
Age     
(in years) -.016 .005 .001 .984 
     
Left-Right Scale     
(1-5) -.350 .104 .001 .704 
     
Source: SCOTTISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2006 
 
Wales 
Table 7 shows the 2006 logistic regression model for support for greater Welsh 
autonomy, either in the form of an independent state or a Welsh parliament similar to 
the current Scottish model. Unlike in Scotland, age is a significant explanatory 
variable in both years: older people are less likely to support further autonomy (in 
2007, odds ratio = 0.985, in 2003, 0.979). Similarly to Scotland, both party 
identification and national identity are significant across both surveys. The party 
reference category is Labour, and in both surveys (as we might expect) supporters of 
Plaid Cymru are more likely to support further autonomy (in 2007, odds ratio = 1.899, 
in 2003, 2.391). No other significant differences related to party identification were 
found in both years. The reference category for national identity is Welsh and British, 
and those with an exclusively Welsh identity were more likely to support further 
autonomy in both surveys (in 2007, odds ratio = 1.527, in 2003, 1.592). Once more 
although we can observe a similar negative effect among those with an exclusively 
British identity in both surveys, in neither one is this statistically significant (in 2006 
p = 0.069; in 2003, p = 0.082). Capacity to speak the Welsh language has a significant 
bivariate association with constitutional preference in both surveys, but in the 2007 
logistic regression model, using fluent Welsh speakers as the reference category, there 
are no significant differences, albeit that this is only marginally so with respect to 
non-fluent Welsh speakers where there is a near significant (negative) association 
with support for greater autonomy (p = 0.068, odds ratio = 0.571). In 2003 those who 
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spoke Welsh but not fluently were significantly less likely to favour enhanced 
autonomy (p = 0.027, odds ratio = 0.536) compared to the reference category of fluent 
Welsh speakers. It should be noted that, as in Scotland, there is consensus to the 
degree that a majority of respondents in all identity categories supported devolution, 
although beliefs about the specific form this should take do vary somewhat in relation 
to national identities. For those with an exclusively Welsh identity or a dual 
Welsh/British identity, a parliament similar to that in Scotland is the most popular 
option, accounting for nearly half of respondents in each category in the 2007 survey, 
and clearly more popular than the status quo which is supported only by around a 
quarter of respondents in each category. For those with an exclusively British identity, 
in 2007 the status quo was the most popular option (31%) albeit only marginally more 
so than a devolved parliament (29%). 
 
Table 7: Logistic regression model of support for greater Welsh autonomy, Wales 
 B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio 
Party     
(Labour)     
Conservative -.283 .206 .169 .754 
Lib Dem -.124 .267 .641 .883 
Plaid Cymru .641 .279 .022 1.899 
None -.481 .248 .052 .618 
     
Welsh language fluency     
(Fluent speakers)     
Non-fluent speakers -.560 .307 .068 .571 
Non-speakers -.306 .264 .246 .736 
     
National Identity     
(Welsh and British)     
Welsh only .424 .193 .028 1.527 
British only -.369 .203 .069 .691 
Neither .282 .314 .369 1.326 
     
Age     
(in years) -.015 .005 .001 .985 
     
Source: Welsh Life and Times Study, 2007 
 
Northern Ireland 
Table 8 shows the 2006 logistic regression model for support for a unified Ireland. 
The necessary data to construct left-right political scales are not available and so this 
is not included as an explanatory variable, but we do include religion, which is 
politically relevant in Northern Ireland but not in the other territories. Among those 
explanatory variables which are shared with the other territories, similarly to Scotland 
and Wales both party identification and national identity are significantly associated 
with support for a reunified Ireland in both surveys. These associations have a 
predictable character. Using Sinn Fein as the reference category for party, supporters 
of all other parties (and indeed supporters of no party) were significantly less likely to 
support reunification in both surveys. The odds ratio is especially low for supporters 
of the Democratic Unionist party. With respect to national identity, Irish only is the 
reference category and in both surveys the (relatively small) group with a dual 
Irish/British identity and those who see themselves as exclusively British were 
significantly less likely to support Irish reunification. This effect is most marked 
among the exclusively British (odds ratio of 0.286 in 2006 and 0.075 in 2003). While 
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these findings might be thought predictable, they do show that both party 
identification and national identity have a statistically significant effect on 
constitutional preference even when controlling for the effect of the other explanatory 
variables. Also interesting is that this is not consistently the case with respect to the 
other explanatory variable where we might have expected to see a similar effect: 
religion. Table 8 does indicate that being Protestant as opposed to Catholic has a 
statistically significant negative effect upon support for Irish unification (odds ratio = 
0.219), but in 2003 this association was not statistically significant (p = 0.105; odds 
ratio = 0.542). The influence of religion on constitutional attitudes is reduced once we 
control for the other explanatory variables. A caveat with respect to our analysis of 
Northern Ireland is that many of the explanatory variables employed are themselves 
quite strongly correlated with one another, which can potentially distort regression 
models. However, the fact that national identities remain significant even under these 
conditions is itself remarkable. 
Similarly to Scotland and Wales then, but unlike England, national identities in 
Northern Ireland are significant predictors of constitutional attitudes. It is also 
important to add that unlike in Scotland and Wales there is polarisation as opposed to 
a strong degree of consensus with respect to these attitudes across different categories 
of national identity. In 2006, using the same question addressed in table 8, while 95% 
of exclusively British respondents believed that Northern Ireland should remain part 
of the UK and only 5% supported Irish reunification, the respective figures for those 
in the exclusively Irish category were 38% and 63%. Northern Ireland is thus an 
example of strong alignment between national identities and political attitudes which 
puts the other territories into context.   
 
Table 8: Logistic regression model of support for Irish unification, Northern Ireland 
 B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio 
Party     
(Sinn Fein)     
SDLP -.422 .299 .159 .656 
UUP -1.839 .607 .002 .159 
DUP -4.415 1.444 .002 .012 
Alliance -1.874 .586 .001 .153 
None -1.180 .312 .000 .307 
     
Social Class     
(Employers, Managers and Professionals)     
Intermediate -.313 .384 .414 .731 
Small employers and self-employed .309 .390 .428 1.362 
Lower supervisory/technical .317 .517 .540 1.373 
Semi-routine/routine .488 .261 .061 1.630 
     
National Identity     
(Irish only)     
Irish and British -.750 .355 .034 .473 
British only -1.253 .313 .000 .286 
Neither -.719 .526 .171 .487 
     
Religion     
(Catholic)     
Protestant -1.519 .456 .001 .219 
None -.083 .319 .795 .920 
     
Age     
(in years) -.005 .006 .427 .995 
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Source: NORTHERN IRELAND LIFE AND TIMES, 2006. 
 
Conclusions 
The degree to which national identities are consistently associated with attitudes 
toward constitutional change, across two distinct time periods, varies between UK 
territories. While in England there is little evidence that national identities are 
constitutionally significant, this is not so in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In 
both Scotland and Wales, even after we have controlled for the effects of other 
political and social variables which we might expect to be associated with attitudes to 
constitutional change, we find that national identities remain significant in explaining 
support for greater sub-state autonomy. This finding would seem to undermine the 
claim that in Scotland there is a ‘… lack of relationship between national identity and 
constitutional preference’ (Bechhofer and McCrone, 2008: 99). However, this is only 
true to the extent that those with exclusive sub-state identities are more likely to 
favour more autonomy: those with exclusive state identities are not consistently and 
significantly more likely to oppose such change than are those with dual identities. In 
both Scotland and Wales being a supporter of the Nationalist political party also has a 
positive effect on support for greater autonomy, independent of the influence of 
national identity. These findings also hold true in Northern Ireland: both national 
identities and party affiliations are associated with constitutional attitudes, 
independent of the effects of other variables (many of which are themselves quite 
strongly associated with national identities). These effects are also somewhat more 
marked than in Scotland and Wales, reflecting comparative lack of consensus 
regarding Northern Ireland’s future within the UK. Interestingly, in relation to Trew’s 
(1998) point about religious affiliations in Northern Ireland being ‘labels’ which 
incorporate national and political allegiance, our evidence suggests that, independent 
of these national and political identities, it is not clear that religious affiliations in 
themselves shape attitudes to constitutional change. 
 
In closing, however, it is important that we contextualize these findings within an 
even broader time period than that considered heretofore. More specifically, we need 
briefly to consider evidence concerning change in the patterns of national identities in 
the UK in recent years. Given that, in some territories at least, we have shown that 
national identities are indeed significantly associated with given constitutional 
attitudes even when other important variables are taken into consideration, then any 
trends which indicate changing patterns of national identification are more likely to 
have constitutional consequences. We do not have the space here to present detailed 
time series for each territory using different measures of national identity but we can 
offer some broad details of trends. In England, there is little consistent evidence of 
growing identification with the sub-state (English) as opposed to state (British) 
identity but, as we have seen, any such shift would be unlikely to have any 
constitutional significance anyway. Such a trend is also absent in Scotland where, at 
least in the post-devolution period, there has been little change in patterns of national 
identities, the principal shift towards greater Scottish as opposed to British 
identification having taken place somewhat earlier (broadly, in the 1980s). So there is 
no evidence that in Scotland the cause of independence is being furthered by an 
increase in exclusive Scottish as opposed to British identities. In Wales, once more 
consistent evidence of substantial change in the post-devolution period is difficult to 
find, although there are some indications of a strengthening of Welsh identification 
relative to Britishness, and we have shown that this phenomenon is likely to 
contribute to demand for further autonomy. Although in some respects patterns of 
 17 
national identities in Northern Ireland are the most stable of all four territories, 
showing little in the way of fluctuation from year to year, there is some evidence that 
the differential between British and Irish identifiers is narrowing somewhat. However, 
since Irish identifiers remain in the minority and are in any case somewhat divided 
over support for a united Ireland, even if this trend is sustained shifts in national 
identity in Northern Ireland seem unlikely to lead to that most radical of constitutional 
changes. 
 
Overall then, we conclude that while national identities are not constitutionally 
significant in England, they are in the other three UK territories. In each of these, the 
association between identities and constitutional preferences cannot simply be 
interpreted as reflecting other political and social characteristics such as party support, 
linguistic status or religion. However, this significance is qualified in each case. In 
Scotland there is strong support for the constitutional status quo across all identity 
categories and there is little evidence of expansion of the group most likely to favour 
independence – those with an exclusive Scottish identity. In Northern Ireland 
maintenance of the status quo also seems the most likely immediate future. Despite 
some evidence of a modest increase in Irish as opposed to British identification, the 
radical constitutional option of Irish unification is not overwhelmingly supported even 
among the Irish group, who in any case remain a clear minority compared to those in 
other identity categories who are unlikely to support a united Ireland. In fact, although 
evidence of a shift towards stronger Welsh identification is somewhat ambiguous, if 
anything it is in Wales that national identities are most likely to have the most 
immediate constitutional import in that any continued trend towards more exclusively 
Welsh identities would contribute to demands for further political autonomy, most 
likely in the form of a legislative parliament.  
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Appendix: survey questions on constitutional preference 
England 
With all the changes going on in the way the different parts of Great Britain are run, which of the 
following do you think would be best for England...  
• ...for England to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament,  
• for each region of England to have its own elected assembly that makes decisions about the 
region's economy, planning and housing,  
• or, for England as a whole to have its own new parliament with law-making powers?  
 
Scotland 
Which of these statements comes closest to your view? 
• Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union 
• Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union 
• Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some 
taxation powers 
• Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation 
powers 
• Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament 
 
Wales 
Which of these statements comes closest to your view? 
• Wales should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union 
• Wales should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union 
• Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has law-making 
and taxation powers 
• Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly which has limited law-
making powers only 
• Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 
 
Northern Ireland 
Which of these statements comes closest to your view? 
• Northern Ireland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union 
• Northern Ireland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European 
Union 
• Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has 
law-making and taxation powers 
• Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly which has 
limited law-making powers only 
• Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 
• Northern Ireland should unify with the Republic of Ireland 
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Notes 
                                                 
i The Devolution and Constitutional Change programme, funded by the ESRC, and the Nations and 
Regions programme, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. 
ii For a key critique of such perspectives see Brubaker & Cooper, 2000. 
iii Similar measures are routinely employed in other parts of the world, particularly in ‘stateless 
nations’ like Catalonia and Quebec (see e.g. McCrone, 2001: 161). 
iv The BSA, SSA and WLT are all conducted by the National Centre for Social Research, the largest 
independent social research institute in Britain (www.natcen.ac.uk). The NILT is conducted by ARK, a 
joint initiative between Queen’s University Belfast and the University of Ulster (www.ark.ac.uk/nilt). 
The data from all these surveys may be downloaded via the UK Data Archive (www.data-
archive.ac.uk), with NILT data also available direct from ARK’s web page. 
v Respondents are asked ‘Please say which, if any, of the words on this card describes the way you 
think of yourself. Please choose as many or as few as apply’. The specified options are: British, 
English, European, Irish, Northern Irish, Scottish, Ulster, Welsh. Respondents may also specify their 
own ‘Other’ identity. 
vi It should also be noted that 11% of respondents chose an Ulster identity, and are not represented in 
the table. 
vii Identities are exclusive only in that one but not the other of the identities shown in the table are 
chosen. The table does not take into consideration whether respondents chose another national identity 
in addition to those shown.  
viii In fact it is interesting that two-thirds of those who do choose a dual identity on the 2006 question 
describe their (best choice) national identity as ‘Northern Irish’, substantiating Trew’s (1998) argument 
that a Northern Irish identity is notable in being one that is open to all sections of the community in 
Northern Ireland. In contrast only 1% and 4% of those whose best choice identity is British and Irish 
respectively choose a dual identity. Thus although the wording of the 2006 question used in Table 2 is 
somewhat novel, the results are highly correlated with more established measures of national identity.   
ix It should be noted that both these early studies pre-date the emergence of Sinn Fein as an additional 
electoral option for nationalists in Northern Ireland. 
x Party identification encapsulates those who explicitly support a particular party or at least feel closer 
to it than other parties. It is commonly used in preference to actual or intended party vote, not least 
because voting is subject to ‘tactical’ variation which might not reflect actual party identification. The 
left-right scale is based on respondents’ level, of agreement (on a five point ‘Likert’ scale) with five or 
six of the following statements (the exact combination varies between surveys and the wording of some 
of the statements is also sometimes varied between positive and negative): 
Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off 
Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers 
Ordinary working people [do not] get their fair share of the nation’s wealth 
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor  
Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance 
There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages  
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems  
Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership  
It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one  
The scale can run from a minimum of 1 (for someone who agrees strongly with all the ‘left wing’ 
statements and/or disagrees strongly with all the ‘right wing’ statements) to a maximum of 5 (for 
someone who agrees strongly with all the ‘right wing’ statements and/or disagrees strongly with all the 
‘left wing’ statements).  
xi This is one of a number of possible employment-based measures of social class used in the UK and 
is employed here because it is the most recently developed. 
xii Previous research which has explored the association between party identification, religion, 
language and national identities and/or constitutional preferences in the UK has been discussed above. 
For examples of work which examines the relationship between national identity and social class see 
Balsom 1985, Bennie et al 1997, Brown et al 1999, Heath & Kellas 1998 and McCrone 2001, and for 
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constitutional attitudes and class see Surridge 2006. For national identity and position on the left-right 
scale see Brown et al 1999 and Rosie & Bond 2007, and for constitutional preference and left-right 
position see Rosie & Bond 2007. For national identity and age see Balsom 1985, Bennie et al 1997, 
Heath & Kellas 1998 and Wyn Jones & Trystan 1999, and for constitutional attitudes and age see 
Paterson et al 2001 and Surridge 2006. 
xiii While logged odds in logistic regression are unbounded, when they are converted back into 
conventional odds ratios, those representing positive associations can take any value greater than 1 
whereas those representing negative associations may only range between 0 and 1. However, 
comparing magnitudes is relatively straightforward: one may simply invert values less than 1 (so e.g., 
an odds ratio of 0.5 would be comparable in magnitude to an odds ratio of 2.0, because 1/0.5 = 2.0). 
